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FROM THE THIEF IN THE NIGHT TO THE GUEST WHO
STAYED TOO LONG:  THE EVOLUTION OF BURGLARY
IN THE SHADOW OF THE COMMON LAW
HELEN A. ANDERSON*
ABSTRACT
Burglary began evolving from the common law crime almost as soon as Lord
Coke defined it in 1641 as breaking and entering a dwelling of another in the
night with the intent to commit a crime therein.  But sometime between the
Model Penal Code in 1962 and today, burglary lost its core actus reus, “entry.” 
In the majority of jurisdictions, burglary can now be accomplished by simply
remaining in a building or vehicle with the intent to commit a crime.  Not only
does such an offense cover a wide range of situations, but it allows burglary to
be attached to almost any crime that occurred indoors, and justify a significant
additional penalty—even death.  Burglary thus functions as a “location
aggravator” for other crimes.  Paradoxically, it may be the shadow of the
common law crime that has obscured the breadth and significance of these
changes.  Burglary’s long tradition and pedigree give an illusion of solidity to the
charge, even when it no longer necessarily describes real criminal conduct
beyond the target offense.
This is the first survey of burglary in the United States since the Model Penal
Code.  It begins with a summary of burglary’s history from the common law
definition through the first two centuries of the republic, then explains the Model
Penal Code proposal for burglary—as well as the Model Code authors’
misgivings about the offense.  The Article then looks in detail at what happened
in the states after the Model Penal Code—how the common law elements
continued to erode until we ended up with today’s very thin crime.  The Article
shows what this has meant:  a serious crime with significant penalties that can be
invoked in a range of situations, e.g., shoplifting, hold-up of a business, or
murder by a houseguest.  It concludes that burglary’s evolution has finally gone
too far, and no longer necessarily describes a distinct offense.  It is only the
memory of the common law offense that keeps courts and lawmakers from
recognizing how empty the crime has become.
INTRODUCTION
What do the following scenarios have in common?  An eleven-year-old girl
enters a store during business hours and eats a chocolate Easter egg without
paying.  A man enters an open gas station, robs it and shoots two employees
dead.  A man invited into a home to socialize turns on his host and kills her. 
Answer:  all can be prosecuted as burglaries.   Such prosecutions would not have1
* Associate Professor, University of Washington School of Law.  I wish to thank Miriam
Korngold for her excellent  research assistance.  I also wish to thank Mary Fan and Elizabeth Porter
for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Davis v. State, 737 So. 2d 480 (Ala. 1999) (holding that evidence of a struggle during
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been possible in the time of Blackstone or Coke, when the common law
definition of burglary (a capital offense) was breaking and entering the dwelling
house of another in the night.2
Few crimes have changed as much over the years as burglary.  From its
origins as the Anglo-Saxon crime of “hamsoken,”  or forcible housebreaking, this3
offense has evolved into a flexible modern one of entering, or merely remaining,
some place with intent to commit a crime.  Not only is the offense generally
simpler, covering much more conduct, but burglary now also functions
increasingly as a way to add to the punishment for the target offenses, those
intended by the defendant.   Some of the most significant changes have occurred4
during the past fifty years.  Criticized heavily in the mid-twentieth century by
scholars and law reformers, the crime of burglary nevertheless survived their
challenges and emerged leaner, and meaner, stripped of its more restrictive
common law requirements and effective as a “location aggravator” —even to the5
point of justifying the death penalty for certain murders.  The modern crime is
a far cry from our idea of the common law offense—a forcible night time
intrusion into the home.
Yet paradoxically, it may be that the idea of the common law offense has
allowed burglary to survive and change.  Burglary’s long tradition and pedigree
gives an illusion of solidity to the charge, even when it no longer necessarily
describes real criminal conduct beyond the target offense.  And courts return to
the common law treatises occasionally to resolve burglary conundrums—as if the
common law offense were still relevant.  Like an impoverished aristocrat,
burglary can rely on its name and reputation to keep courts and lawmakers from
realizing just how little remains of its former estate.
This Article explores the history of burglary law in the United States, with
particular emphasis on the last fifty years, when burglary evolved so far as to lose
the central conduct of its “actus reus,” entry.  In the majority of jurisdictions,
burglary can now be accomplished by simply remaining in a building or vehicle
a murder can support finding of unlawfully remaining on premises and therefore support burglary
charge); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 441 (Ky. 2011) (upholding burglary conviction where
defendant entered two different gas stations, and shot employees at both); In re T.J.E., 426 N.W.2d
23 (S.D. 1988), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Miranda, 776 N.W.2d 77 (S.D. 2009),
discussed infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
3. “[Burglary’s] origins lie in the ancient Anglo-Saxon crime of hamsocn or hamsoken,
which was an attack upon, or forcible entry into, a man’s house.”  Theodore E. Lauer, Burglary in
Wyoming, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 721, 721 (1997).
4. See infra Part II.
5. As used here, the term “location aggravator” refers to the use of burglary charges to add
significant penalties to other completed crimes based on where those crimes took place.  See infra
Part IV.  Thus, for example, burglary might be charged along with assault and robbery where the
victims are assaulted and robbed in a building.  See infra Part IV.
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with the intent to commit a crime.   Not only does such an offense cover a wide6
range of situations, but it allows burglary to be attached to almost any crime that
occurs indoors.  This significant transformation has generated little discussion.
This Article provides the first comprehensive study of the law of burglary in
the United States since the Model Penal Code.  Two law review articles surveyed
state burglary statutes in 1951  and the Model Penal Code revised comments7
looked at many of the new state criminal codes in 1980.   This Article takes these8
surveys as comparison points for a review of state and federal burglary laws
today.  This survey shows that since the Model Penal Code, burglary has
continued to shed common law requirements, and increasingly is charged
together with other serious crimes to function as a location aggravator.  The
elements of “night time,” “breaking,” “dwelling,” and even “entry” are no longer
required under many statutes.  The survey shows burglary’s continuing evolution
from a six-element common law crime to (in its most extreme form) a
streamlined modern offense of being in the wrong place with the wrong intent. 
While there is still a core of conduct that is popularly understood and prosecuted
as burglary, at the margins the reach of burglary statutes has extended
considerably.
Academic interest in burglary was high during the Model Penal Code era, as
scholars pointed out the illogical aspects of the law.  Indeed, the law of burglary
frustrates those of us who want a rational criminal code.   No one wonders why9
murder and theft are crimes, but unlike with other offenses that began as common
law crimes, the purpose of burglary is unclear.  Is it to punish attempted crime? 
To protect personal security in the home?  Or to protect property?  All of these
justifications have been offered.   More importantly, from a rational standpoint,10
the crime of burglary seems unnecessary.  The offense is really a combination of
offenses:  criminal trespass plus the attempt to commit another offense, or
criminal trespass plus a completed offense.  In fact, it is often charged together
with the attempted or completed offense.11
This lack of a clear rationale almost led the Modal Penal Code authors to
propose abolishing the crime altogether.   Out of deference to the prevailing12
view and tradition, however, they included it in the 1962 Model Code.   Their13
proposal rejected some of the ways in which the crime had already been
broadened, and the authors cautioned against trends to further extend the crime. 
6. See infra note 113.
7. See Note, A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 1009 (1951)
[hereinafter A Rationale of the Law of Burglary]; Minturn T. Wright III, Note, Statutory
Burglary—The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (1951).
8. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
9. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 1079-80 (5th ed. 2010).
10. Id. at 1080.
11. See id.
12. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
13. See infra text accompanying note 90.
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For the most part, states ignored this advice.  Burglary evolved  and14
survived—despite the lack of clear rationale and in the face of significant
critique.  However, the Model Code authors’ misgivings about the offense proved
well-founded as its reach expanded.
Part I of this Article lays out Lord Coke’s influential common law definition
of burglary and then summarizes the evolution of burglary law in the states,
providing the background for the Model Penal Code proposal in 1962.  Part II
looks at the Model Penal Code proposal for burglary, and explains the drafters’
critique of burglary as it then existed in most American jurisdictions.  Part III
addresses developments since the Model Penal Code until the present day,
examining how states have addressed each of the common law elements,
particularly “entry.”  Part IV describes the several federal breaking and/or
entering statutes.  Part V examines burglary’s increasingly significant role as a
location aggravator—the way in which it is used to add punishment (even the
death penalty) to offenses committed in particular locations.  Part VI looks at
how, despite all these changes, the common law crime continues to play a role
in discussions of modern burglary, demonstrating that burglary still exists in the
shadow of the common law.
I.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BURGLARY
A study of the law of burglary in the United States presents significant
challenges.  Every state has its own statutory scheme, and the variation is
enormous.  Some states define a single crime of burglary.  Others divide the
crime into degrees.  Still others have developed different statutes for the type of
structure entered, the type of crime intended, or the status of the victim. 
Jurisdictions with determinate sentencing schemes may deal with aggravating
factors through sentencing, rather than in the definition of the crime.  There is
little agreement among states as to the essential elements of burglary.  A study
in 1951 commented on the wide variation in state approaches.   Revised15
comments to the Model Penal Code made the same point in 1980.   More than16
14. “Evolution” is a useful metaphor for the process of change over time to the offenses that
fall under the heading of burglary.  The term suggests adaptation and the gradual withering away
of aspects (elements) that are no longer useful.  But obviously this metaphor is not perfect. 
Burglary is not an organism; it exists only as an artifact of human lawmakers, and any changes
occur in their (successive) minds and actions.  See Kay L. Levine, The External Evolution of
Criminal Law, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1039, 1047-48 (2008) (discussing the usefulness, with
caveats, of considering change in criminal law through the lens of “external evolution”).  At the
same time, the metaphor of evolution reinforces the enduring link to the common law crime, and
mirrors the way in which judges even now refer back to the common law when deciding questions
about modern statutory versions of the crime.  See infra Part V.
15. See Wright, supra note 7, at 415.
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. 1, at 66 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980)
(“It is also worth noting that a haphazardly defined burglary offense impedes scientific study of
crime and its treatment by making statistical studies based on this categorization virtually
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thirty years later, it is safe to say that there has been no subsequent trend toward
uniformity.
Nevertheless, the current array of statutes has a common ancestor in the
English common law.
A.  Common Law Burglary
In his Institutes of the Laws of England, Lord Coke in 1641 defined burglary
as:
A Burglar (or the person that committeth burglary) is by the common
law a felon, that in the night breaketh and entreth into a mansion house
of another, of intent to kill some reasonable creature, or to commit some
other felony within the same, whether his felonious intent be executed
or not.17
This is the oft-cited  common law definition that still influences the law today. 18
Burglary had been an offense long before Lord Coke’s formulation, having its
roots in the crime known as “housebreaking” or “hamsecken.”   But Coke’s six-19
element crime took hold.
Coke also defined each element of burglary.  Night he defined as when
“darkeness comes” and “you cannot discerne the countenance of a man.”   Night20
“doth aggravate the offence, for the night is the time wherein man is to rest, and
wherein beasts runne about seeking their prey.”   Breaking he defined through21
examples:  If a thief enters the house through an open door or window, there is
no breaking; but if the thief breaks the glass of the window and uses a hook to
meaningless.”).
17. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 63
(London, W. Clarke & Sons 1809) (1644).
18. Coke “through his Institutes turn[ed] a jumble of law into an astonishingly complete,
reconciled, organized body of propositions which concealed all the ‘inconsistencies and difficulties
which were inherent in his position[.]’”  GERHARD O. W. MUELLER, CRIME, LAW AND THE
SCHOLARS 17 (1969).  Coke’s burglary definition is cited in Wright, supra note 7, at 411, and A
Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1009.  This is substantially the common law
definition referred to, without attribution, in the commentaries to the Model Penal Code.  MODEL
PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. 1, at 61 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
19. Commonwealth v. Hope, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 1, 4-5 (quoting 1 Hale’s P.C. 547).  The
gravamen of the offense was to break and enter a house, and a felonious intent was more or less
assumed from the breaking and entering.  Id.  The crime was intended to protect the sanctity and
security of the home, and was punishable by death.  Lauer, supra note 3, at 724.  The crime was
mentioned as early as 942.  Id.  A thirteenth century reference to burglars defines them as “all those
who feloniously in the time of peace break churches, or the houses of others, or the walls or gates
of our cities or boroughs.”  BRITTON:  AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES 36 (Francis Morgan
Nichols ed. 1901), cited in Lauer, supra note 3, at 725 n.15.
20. COKE, supra note 17, at 63.
21. Id.
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pull goods out of the house through the window, there has been a breaking (and
an entry).   Entry could be made by any part of the body or a weapon or a tool.  22 23
A mansion house did not mean only grand homes, but included “every house for
the dwelling and habitation of man.”24
Coke treated “breaking and entering” together, almost as if they were one
element.  Separately or together, they caused great difficulty for the English
courts.  For example, was there a breaking if a man climbed down a chimney
opening?  Did it make a difference if he dislodged some bricks during his
descent?   As one scholar wrote of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries25
in England:
A person who assaulted a home-owner at the latter’s threshold was held
to be a burglar because his pistol passed over the line of the doorway. 
An offender who, in the act of unfastening a window, allowed his finger
to pass over the sill, but who was apprehended at that point, was held to
have entered the house.  But the conviction of another offender was
reversed because, in the act of prying open a shutter, no part of his body
or any instrument entered the space between the shutter and the
window.26
The mansion-house or dwelling requirement also led to fine distinctions and
expansion.  For example, the dwelling was expanded to “include all out-buildings
within the curtilage of the dwelling provided they were enclosed by a common
fence.”   If a home was left in the care of domestic servants, it was still a27
dwelling, but not if left in the care of other employees.   The other elements of28
burglary lead to similar hair-splitting decisions.29
B.  Burglary in America Before 1960
The colonists brought the common law with them from England, but they did
not simply replicate the English system.   Crime became a matter for legislation. 30
The colonies had their own penal codes—Massachusetts’ colonial code provided
that a burglar be branded on the forehead with the letter “B” for a first offense.  31
Throughout the nineteenth century “[t]he concept of the common-law crime was
22. Id. at 64.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See JOHN HOSTETTLER, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 76
(2009) (discussing Sir Matthew Hale’s analysis of such a case in 1736).
26. Wright, supra note 7, at 412 (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 413.
28. Id. 
29. See id. at 413-14.
30. See MUELLER, supra note 18, at 9-15.
31. Lauer, supra note 3, at 730.
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in retreat.”   More and more states passed comprehensive penal codes, and there32
was a prevailing idea that judges should not make up crimes.33
As burglary became a creature of statute, it varied by jurisdiction.  By the end
of the nineteenth century, the elements of night time, entry, breaking, and the
structure to be entered, varied considerably.   “Some states retained the common34
law elements of dwelling house and in the night time; others broadened burglary
to include structures of nearly all kinds, and embraced entries made in both day
and night.”   These variations persisted through the first half of the twentieth35
century.  By 1950, breaking and night time were on the wane, the mansion house
or dwelling had been expanded to include many types of structures, but entry was
still required, as shown by the following summary of the two 1951 surveys of
burglary law.36
1.  Night Time.—Already in 1951, night time was not an element in eleven
jurisdictions.   In nine jurisdictions, however, it was the sole aggravating37
circumstance for first degree burglary,  and in thirty-two jurisdictions it was a38
requirement for the highest level of burglary.   Night time was usually defined39
as the hours between sunset and sunrise, or thirty minutes after sunset until thirty
minutes before sunrise.   An alternative definition was Coke’s “when a man’s40
face could not be discerned.”41
2.  Breaking.—In 1951, breaking was an element of burglary in eighteen  or42
nineteen  jurisdictions.  At that time, twelve jurisdictions did not require43
breaking.   But even where breaking was a statutory element, courts were44
willing, as under the common law, to stretch the requirement to include minimal
force such as raising a partly open window, or pushing open an unlatched door.  45
Breaking might also be satisfied by “constructive breaking,” gaining entry by
ruse or deceit.   As noted later in the Model Penal Code commentaries, “the46
‘breaking’ had become little more than symbolic.”47
32. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 65 (1993).
33. See id.
34. See Lauer, supra note 3, at 728-30.
35. Id. at 731-32.
36. See A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7; Wright, supra note 7.
37. Wright, supra note 7, at 417.
38. Id.
39. A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1015.
40. Wright, supra note 7, at 417 & n.52.
41. Martha Grace Duncan, Beauty in the Dark of Night:  The Pleasures of Form in Criminal
Law, 59 EMORY L.J. 1203, 1242 (2010) (citation omitted).
42. A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1014.
43. Wright, supra note 7, at 415.
44. A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1013.
45. Wright, supra note 7, at 416 n.44.
46. A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1012 n.19 (citing cases where
defendants lied or otherwise tricked a person into admitting them onto premises).
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. 3, at 69 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
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3.  Entry.—In 1951, “virtually all” jurisdictions required an entry for
burglary, although the requirement was often applied in surprising ways.  48
Texas, for example, included the firing of a bullet into a house as an entry.   As49
under common law, the entry of any part of the body or a tool connected to the
body might qualify.   Some jurisdictions had statutes that required breaking or50
entering, but a breaking without entry would most likely be treated as an
attempted burglary.  51
4.  Dwelling.—The common law requirement that the site of burglary be a
dwelling was early on broadened to include other types of buildings, especially
outbuildings within the curtilage.   Well before the mid-twentieth century, many52
statutes included shops, storehouses, ships, churches, etc., as buildings that could
be burglarized.   By 1951, many statutes contained long lists of structures,53
including vehicles and railroad cars.   Not all statutes were so broad, but none54
was restricted to dwellings.55
In thirty-one jurisdictions, burglary of a dwelling was a distinguishing aspect
of the highest degree of burglary in 1951.   But, while the burglary of a dwelling,56
especially an occupied dwelling, continued to be treated severely, by 1951 the
burglary laws had expanded to include all kinds of structures and vehicles.
5.  Of Another.—The common law requirement that the place entered be that
“of another” had almost disappeared from the statutory definitions of burglary
by the mid-twentieth century.   However, it remained an implied element. 57
Courts consistently ruled that “a man cannot commit burglary in his own
house.”   The right protected was possession.  Possession meant a right of58
48. See Wright, supra note 7, at 416. 
49. Id. at 416 n.47.  The statutory definition of entry no longer includes shooting into a
building.  See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (West 2011).
50. Wright, supra note 7, at 416.
51. Id. at 416 n.45.
52. See State v. Engel, 210 P.3d 1007, 1011 (Wash. 2009) (discussing the curtilage concept
in determining the scope of a “fenced area” under the burglary statute).
53. Lauer, supra note 3, at 731.
54. One example comes from Nebraska:  “dwelling house, kitchen, smokehouse,
slaughterhouse, shop, office, storehouse, mill, pottery, factory, watercraft, schoolhouse, church or
meetinghouse, barn, chicken house, stable, warehouse, malthouse, stillhouse, public building, or
other private building, railroad car factory, station house, railroad car, public or private telephone
pay station or booth.”  Wright, supra note 7, at 417 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-532 (1948)).
55. See id. at 418.  “In every jurisdiction, virtually all buildings are covered by one or more
degrees of the crime.”  A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1011.
56. A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1011.  According to the other 1951
article, the element of “dwelling” was an additional aggravating circumstance in fourteen states, and
the sole aggravating circumstance in seven.  Wright, supra note 7, at 418-19.  Many of these
statutes required that the dwelling be occupied or inhabited—in contrast to the common law.  See
id. at 419.
57. Wright, supra note 7, at 419.
58. Id.
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occupancy, not necessarily ownership.  Thus, for example, a lessor could
burglarize a structure leased to another.59
6.  Intent to Commit a Felony Therein.—Lord Coke’s definition required the
intent to commit a felony.   By 1951, most state statutes still required the “intent60
to commit a felony, or a felony or any larceny.”   (The inclusion of “any61
larceny” or “any theft” allowed prosecutors to proceed without proving a
felonious monetary value for the goods intended to be stolen.   Such an approach62
would be helpful to prosecutors where the defendant was apprehended before he
took any property.)  Fifteen state statutes then allowed the intent to commit any
crime, and seven state statutes limited the intended crimes to a specified list.63
7.  Grading of Burglary.—At common law, burglary was a single offense,
punishable by death.   In the United States, the penalty varied by state, even in64
the eighteenth century.   As with the other common law offenses, over time,65
most jurisdictions developed different grades of burglary or increased penalties
if different factors were present.  In the mid-twentieth century, close to two-thirds
of the states had a separate offense for “burglary with explosives,” which was
punished more severely than other burglary crimes.   Seventeen states provided66
a heavier penalty if the burglar was armed.   Seventeen required that the67
structure entered be “occupied” or “inhabited” to support first degree burglary
charges.   Looking at aggravation slightly differently, another author reported68
that, in 1951, twelve states had what is essentially common law burglary as
burglary in the first degree.  69
Thus, during the 1950s, as the American Law Institute was drafting the
59. Id. at 420.
60. See supra text accompanying note 17.
61. Wright, supra note 7, at 420 (citation omitted).  At that time, twenty-eight jurisdictions
required the intent to commit a felony or any larceny.  A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra
note 7, at 1017.
62. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. 3(c), at 77 (Official Draft & Revised Comments
1980).
63. A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1017.
64. See HOSTETTLER, supra note 25, at 76.
65. For example, in the early years of the Republic, Pennsylvania and New York abolished
the death penalty for burglary and some other serious offenses.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 73.
66. A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1018 (stating that twenty-nine states
had separate offense of burglary with explosives); see also Wright, supra note 7, at 430 n.148
(stating that all but seventeen state jurisdictions had a separate offense of burglary with explosives).
67. A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1018.
68. Id. at 1019 n.72.  To be occupied or inhabited, structure need not have a person present;
such structures were much like the common law definition of a dwelling.  See id.
69. Wright, supra note 7, at 421.  According to this source, another group of states then used
one or more of the following factors to elevate the crime:  a person is present, the defendant is
armed, the defendant assaults someone, the defendant brings confederates, or the defendant uses
false keys.  Id. at 422.  One or more of the common law elements of “night time” or “dwelling”
were also used to elevate the crime in some jurisdictions.  Id. at 422-23.
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Model Penal Code, the critical elements of burglary were entry of a structure
with intent to commit a crime. The more serious grades of burglary often
included the elements of an occupied dwelling, or weapons. 
II.  THE MODEL PENAL CODE’S BURGLARY PROPOSAL
The Model Penal Code Final Draft appeared in 1962.   The final draft70
included general provisions about criminal liability and defenses, as well as
proposals for specific offenses.   The comments to the model burglary offense71
noted the way in which the crime had already been significantly broadened from
the common law definition, and criticized the harshness and irrationality of the
offense.   The comments suggest that the authors considered eliminating72
burglary as a distinct offense, but that “[c]enturies of history and a deeply
imbedded Anglo-American conception such as burglary, however, are not easily
discarded.”   Instead, the Model Code proposed an offense “limited . . . to the73
invasion of premises under circumstances especially likely to terrorize
occupants.”  74
Section 221.1 defined the crime of burglary as follows:
(1) Burglary Defined. A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a
building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion
thereof, with purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are
at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to
enter.  It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for burglary that the
building or structure was abandoned.
(2) Grading.  Burglary is a felony of the second degree if it is perpetrated
in the dwelling of another at night, or if, in the course of committing the
offense, the actor:
(a) purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to
inflict bodily injury on anyone; or 
(b) is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon. 
Otherwise, burglary is a felony of the third degree.  An act shall be
deemed “in the course of committing” an offense if it occurs in an
attempt to commit the offense or in flight after the attempt or
commission.
(3) Multiple convictions. A person may not be convicted both for
burglary and for the offense which it was his purpose to commit after the
70. See MODEL PENAL CODE:  COMPLETE STATUTORY TEXT (1985) (containing the completed
official draft adopted in 1962).
71. See generally id.
72. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmts. 1-2, at 61-68 (Official Draft & Revised Comments
1980).
73. Id. § 221.1 cmt. 2, at 67.
74. Id.
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burglarious entry or for an attempt to commit that offense, unless the
additional offense constitutes a felony of the first or second degree.75
In addition to this model burglary offense, the Model Code proposed the
crime of criminal trespass, which did not require proof of intent to commit a
crime.   At common law, trespass was not a crime, only a private wrong.76 77
The model burglary statute thus is broader than the common law crime
because it encompasses entry of buildings, not just dwellings, and is not
restricted to night time.  The intended crime need not be a felony.  However, the
authors rejected other expansions of the crime already endorsed by various
jurisdictions.  For example, the proposed statute applies only to buildings and
occupied structures, not vehicles or storage containers, and it requires an
unprivileged entry.   However, entry of a dwelling at night results in a higher78
degree of the model offense.   The crime is also aggravated if the actor attempts79
bodily injury or is armed —reflecting a concern with the risk to personal80
security.  Thus, the Model Code increases the punishment for conduct that
threatens human life or safety.  Moreover, reflecting a concern for
proportionality, the Model Code prohibits adding a burglary conviction to the
conviction for the completed or attempted target offense.
The authors of the Model Penal Code believed that the crime had broadened
to compensate for defects in the law of attempts, and that the expanded crime
was no longer necessary in light of the Model Penal Code reform of attempt
law.   According to the comments, common law attempt was difficult to prove81
because the actor must have come very close to achieving the criminal
goal—sometimes requiring that the actor commit the “final act,” and only being
thwarted by circumstances beyond the actor’s control.   82
Burglary was a common law offense long before attempts were made
generally punishable.   A possible illustration of burglary substituting for83
attempt is a seventeenth century English case in which the defendants were
convicted  and executed for burglary after unsuccessfully trying to kill a man by
shooting him through a hole in the wall of their adjoining houses.   Today, such84
75. Id. § 221.1.
76. Id. § 221.2.
77. See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 417 A.2d 1085, 1087 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
78. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. 3.  The authors sought to avoid the application of
burglary to what would otherwise be considered theft or shoplifting from a commercial
establishment open to the public.  See id.  They specifically rejected the expansion of entry to
include “remaining,” or even “remaining surreptitiously,” drawn from the model criminal trespass
statute.  See id. § 221.2.
79. Id. § 221.1(2).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 221.1 cmt. 2.
82. Id.
83. See LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 11.4(e).
84. This case is recounted in HOSTETTLER, supra note 25, at 76.  “Presumably it was shown
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an act would probably be charged as both attempted murder and burglary.  The
modern—and Model Penal Code—approach is to allow conviction for attempt
based on a “substantial step” toward the criminal goal.85
According to the Model Penal Code’s comments, and other contemporary
scholars, the crime of burglary had been expanded by courts and legislatures to
reach conduct that threatened persons and property but could not otherwise be
punished under the common law as an attempt.   The comments noted the86
irrational results of this expansion in many jurisdictions:  stealing a car might be
punished less severely than breaking into the car to take something from the
glovebox; stealing a chicken might be petty larceny, but entering a henhouse to
steal the chicken would be a serious offense.   The comments also noted the87
unfairness resulting from adding burglary sentences to the punishment for the
completed target offense.   This “double punishment” was not possible with88
attempts; an ordinary attempt would merge with the completed offense so that a
defendant could not be convicted of both the completed offense and an attempt.  89
Despite these criticisms of burglary law, the Model Code retained the offense
of burglary in part out of “deference to the momentum of historical tradition,”
and because the offense “reflects a considered judgment that especially severe
sanctions are appropriate for criminal invasion of premises under circumstances
likely to terrorize occupants.”   The Model Code’s approach reflected its90
“principled pragmatism.”91
The Model Penal Code critique of burglary reflected contemporary concerns
that the tip of the pistol entered the injured man’s room.”  Id.
85. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c); see LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 11.4(e) (noting that the
Model Penal Code’s substantial step language has been adopted by the majority of states in the
“modern recodifications”).
86. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. 1; see also A Rationale of the Law of Burglary,
supra note 7, at 1023 (noting that the law of attempt provides an “incidental justification for the law
of burglary”); Susan Bundy Cocke, Note, Reformation of Burglary, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211,
224 (1969) (arguing that burglary had evolved to compensate for defects in attempt law leading to
“chaotic and anomalous theoretical and practical results”); Wright, supra note 7, at 433 (arguing
that burglary is a type of attempt:  “No other reasoning sufficiently explains the great expansion of
burglary made by our statutes.”).
87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. 1, at 63-65.
88. See id. at 65-66.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 221 introductory note.
91. Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 594
(1963).
[T]he dominant tone of the Code is one of principled pragmatism.  Perhaps the adjective
and the noun should be reversed, because fidelity to principle is the solid base on which
the Code is built.  But its provisions reflect an awareness that the discernment of right
principles is only the beginning of rational lawmaking and that the besetting sin of
rationality is the temptation to press a principle to the outer limits of its logic.
Id.
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with deterrence and rationalization of the criminal code.  Burglary had been
broadened far beyond housebreaking, to the point where it could function as a
“generalized law of attempts” in many jurisdictions, protecting personal and
property security.   But burglary was never solely aimed at attempted crimes. 92
Its original concern was for the security of the home and the potential for
violence and terror resulting from home invasion.   In any event, burglary has93
picked up multiple justifications along its journey to its present form.94
The Model Penal Code drafters were correct, however, in their observations
that burglary unfairly added excessive penalties to otherwise ordinary thefts. 
They could not have foreseen how much further the crime would expand, and
how its role as a location aggravator would grow.
92. “There exists persuasive argument that statutory burglary has been enlarged to such an
extent that it has become, in reality, a generalized law of attempts, and there exists conclusive
support for the proposition that burglary is no longer aimed at the protection of the habitation.”
Cocke, supra note 86, at 213 (citations omitted).
93.
It is evident that the offense of burglary at common law was considered one aimed at the
security of the habitation rather than against property.  That is to say, it was the
circumstance of midnight terror aimed toward a man or his family who were in rightful
repose in the sanctuary of the home, that was punished, and not the fact that the
intended felony was unsuccessful.  Such attempted immunity extended to a man’s
dwelling or mansion house has been said to be attributable to the early common-law
principle that a man’s home is his castle.  The jealousy with which the law guarded
against any infringement of this ancient right of peaceful habitation is best illustrated
by the severe penalties which at common law were assessed against a person convicted
of burglary, even though the enterprise, except for the essential elements of breaking
and entering a mansion house or dwelling house at night with intent to commit a felony
therein, was unsuccessful.
Id. at 211 n.5 (quoting Annotation, Burglary:  Outbuildings or the Like as Part of a “Dwelling
House,” 43 A.L.R.2d 831, 834-35 (1955)).
94. See 13 AM. JUR. 2D Burglary § 3 (2009).
The purpose of burglary statutes is to protect possessory rights with respect to structures
and conveyances, to define prohibited space and to protect the integrity of the home. 
The historical principle underlying the law of burglary is protection of the right of
habitation.  Thus, burglary is actually an offense against the possession of property and
not necessarily against the ownership thereof.
However, it has also been stated that burglary laws are based primarily upon a
recognition of the dangers to personal safety created by the usual burglary
situation—the danger that the intruder will harm the occupants in attempting to
perpetrate the intended crime or to escape, and the danger that the occupants will in
anger or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby inviting more violence.  Thus,
burglary laws are also designed primarily to protect against the creation of a situation
dangerous to personal safety caused by unauthorized entry.
Id. (citations omitted).
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III.  BURGLARY AFTER THE MODEL PENAL CODE
In 1980-85, revised commentaries to the Model Penal Code were published
“to reflect and explore the far reaching legislative and judicial response to the
Code.”   By then, there had been “widespread revision and codification of the95
substantive criminal law of the United States”;  at least twenty-nine revised96
codes by 1980, with more in process.   With respect to burglary laws, some97
aspects of the Model Penal Code were incorporated in many revisions, but there
was great variation, as shown below.   Some aspects of the proposed code were98
soundly rejected, as reflected by, for example, the widespread adoption of
“remaining” as an alternative to “entry” in defining the elements of burglary.  
When states adopted aspects of the model crime, such as basing a higher
degree on possession of a deadly weapon or infliction of bodily injury, it is
difficult to know whether the Model Code influenced the legislatures, or vice
versa.  Regardless of the cause, there are some very clear trends in burglary
statutes since the Model Penal Code.  The element of “night time” has almost
disappeared.  “Breaking” remains a formal element in only twelve jurisdictions,
and even in these, it is broadly interpreted.  “Entry,” once considered an essential
aspect of burglary, is no longer required in a majority of
jurisdictions—“remaining” may suffice.  The structure entered or remained in
need not always be that “of another,” especially where domestic violence is
involved.  The majority of states no longer require the “intent to commit a
felony,” but more commonly require only the intent to commit a crime.  Thus,
since the Model Penal Code, the erosion of the common law elements has
continued.  The most significant change is the widespread elimination of entry
as a requirement.
Developments in the law of burglary since the Model Penal Code are
addressed in detail below with respect to each of the major common law
elements. 
A.  Night Time
The Model Penal Code burglary proposal did not have night time as an
element of ordinary burglary but included it as an element of the higher degree
offense.   This approach has not been taken up by the states.  Today, only two99
95. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. I, at xii (1985) [hereinafter MPC
COMMENTARIES].  The revised commentaries to the model burglary statute were published in 1980. 
See MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
96. MPC COMMENTARIES, supra note 95, at xi.
97. See id.
98. The general provisions of the Model Penal Code were very influential, but its proposals
for the definitions of particular crimes were less so.  See Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal
Code, Second (Federal?):  The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297, 299
(1998).
99. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
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states retain night time as an element of burglary—although both jurisdictions
also have lesser offenses for what would in most places be considered
burglary.   Only seven other states use night time as a factor to elevate the100
degree of the offense.101
The use of night time as an element of burglary offenses has thus diminished
considerably.  Its lesser importance in a world of artificial light probably makes
sense:  In the urban environments where most people now live, it is rare to
encounter a darkness so deep that “a man’s face could not be discerned.”  In
addition, with burglary now applicable to many more structures and places than
the home, time of day seems less relevant.  Historically, night time invasions of
the home were seen as particularly threatening.   The special protection of the102
dwelling at night is seen in search and seizure law.   (“[I]t is difficult to imagine103
a more severe invasion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a private
home. . . .” )104
Burglary is no longer concerned only, or even primarily, with protecting the
100. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §§ 14, 18 (West 2012) (defining burglary as
breaking and entering a dwelling house in the night time, but also defining  an offense of breaking
and entering in the daytime); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-89, -90 (2011) (defining burglary as breaking
and entering in the night time with intent to commit a felony, but also defining an offense of
breaking and entering a dwelling in the daytime with intent to commit certain felonies).
101. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-101 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 826
(2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-02 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-5 (2011) (defining offense
of entering a building in the night time with intent to commit a crime).  Other breaking and entering
offenses do not require that they occur at night.  Id. §§ 11-8-2, -2.1, -2.2; S.C. CODE ANN. §16-11-
311(2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-32-1 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-11 (West 2012).
102. See Duncan, supra note 41, at 1242 (commenting on the role of darkness and night in
criminal law).
103.
At common law there was a strong hostility to nighttime searches of a dwelling house. 
Commonwealth v. Hinds, 145 Mass. 182, 13 N.E. 397 (1887).  Nighttime searches were
regarded with revulsion because of the indignity of rousing people from their beds. 
Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 535, 541, 495 N.E.2d 328 (1986).  The
underlying rationale was that night time police intrusion posed a great threat to privacy,
violated the sanctity of home, and endangered the police and slumbering citizens.  2
W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.7(b), at 266 (2d ed. 1987).  See, e.g., Gooding v.
United States, 416 U.S. 430, 463, 94 S.Ct. 1780, 1797, 40 L.Ed.2d 250 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (nighttime searches involve greater intrusion than ordinary
searches); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210, 81 S.Ct. 473, 496, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part) (“Searches of the dwelling house were the special
object of this universal condemnation of official intrusion.  Night-time search was
[considered] the evil in its most obnoxious form”); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 498, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 1257, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a
more severe invasion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a private home”).
Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. 1992) (alteration in original).
104. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958).
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home, and night time is no longer what it was when the common law was
developed.  The fact that the element of night time is retained at all in nine
jurisdictions is a testament to the enduring influence of the common law
definition.
B.  Breaking
The element of breaking was not included in the Model Penal Code proposal.
 As with night time, even the formal breaking requirement has significantly
eroded in the last sixty years.  As an element, breaking has long been interpreted
liberally, and now it has been eliminated altogether in more than two-thirds of
United States jurisdictions.
Twelve jurisdictions retain breaking as an element, although not for all
degrees of the offense, and in most, it has been judicially interpreted to mean
little more than unlawful entry.   Most jurisdictions permit “constructive105
breaking,” meaning entry gained by artifice, trick, fraud or threat.   In Virginia106
and Massachusetts, breaking is required for daytime burglary, but entry alone is
sufficient for night.   The use of force to gain entry is no longer an essential107
aspect of burglary.
105. See MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW §§ 6-202, -203, -204 (West 2011) (includes breaking as
an element, but breaking includes entry gained by artifice or fraud, Winder v. State, 765 A.2d 97,
124 (Md. 2001)); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 30.02, -.03, -.04 (West 2011) (breaking is an element
only of burglary of coin-operated machines or burglary of vehicles); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-3-
11, -12 (West 2012) (breaking only required for some burglary crimes); see also Commonwealth
v. Labare, 416 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (holding breaking includes “constructive
breaking”); People v. Toole, 576 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (holding any force,
however slight, used to open a door or window constitutes a breaking); Magee v. State, 966 So. 2d
173, 180 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (holding any effort, such as turning a door knob, constitutes a
breaking); State v. McDowell, 522 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Neb. 1994) (holding that opening of a closed
door is breaking); State v. Abdullah, 967 A.2d 469, 476 (R.I. 2009) (holding breaking requires
force, however slight, to gain entry); Bright v. Commonwealth, 356 S.E.2d 443, 445 (Va. Ct. App.
1987) (opening of secured window is breaking).
106. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 516 S.E.2d 106, 117 (N.C. 1999) (holding that for first degree
burglary, “breaking may be actual or constructive”); Patton v. State, 973 P.2d 270, 287 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1998) (holding breaking includes constructive breaking by fraud, trick or threat).
107. In Massachusetts, breaking is accomplished by any slight force, and includes constructive
breaking.  See 14A HOWARD J. ALPERIN, MASS. PRACTICE, SUMMARY OF BASIC LAW § 7.206 (4th
ed. 2011).  The law is similar in Virginia.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 275 S.E.2d 592,
594 (Va. 1981).  The breaking requirement cannot be completely ignored, however.  See, e.g.,
Finney v. Commonwealth, 671 S.E.2d 169, 173-74 (Va. 2009) (holding no evidence of breaking
where no indication defendant applied even slight force to enter owner’s shed); Broady v.
Commonwealth, 429 S.E.2d 468, 473-74 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing burglary conviction where
no evidence of actual or constructive breaking when defendant followed couple into their hotel
room).
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C.  Entry
One mid-century researcher noted that if breaking were not a requirement,
the practical result might be the elimination of the element of unlawful entry.  108
“The result is that, where the scope of the crime extends to stores, every
shoplifter who enters with the requisite intent . . . is liable to far larger penalties
than those for larceny.”   His example was not that far-fetched,  and his109 110
analysis of the relationship between a decline in breaking and a decline in the
requirement of entry proved prescient.  The breaking requirement, however
weak, was one way to ensure entry was unlawful.111
The Model Penal Code proposal required entry, but it attached no liability
if “the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or
privileged to enter.”   Thus, under the Model Code, entry must be unauthorized.112
Since that time, the requirement of entry has become the minority approach. 
At least twenty-nine jurisdictions have modified the statutory entry requirement
to include “remaining unlawfully” or “remaining.”   Only some of these113
108. A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1014-15.
109. Id. at 1014. He advocated a requirement that if breaking is not an element, the entry be
unpermitted or trespassery.  Id.
110. Even one hundred years ago, there were courts that upheld burglary convictions where
the entry was lawful.  See, e.g., Pinson v. State, 121 S.W. 751, 753-54 (Ark. 1909) (defendant
entered saloon through main door during business hours with intent to steal whiskey); People v.
Barry, 29 P. 1026, 1027 (Cal. 1892) (defendant entered grocery store during business hours with
intent to steal food), cited in Wright, supra note 7, at 419 n.71.  California has continued to adhere
to this rule.  See Comment, Criminal Law—Development of the Law of Burglary in California, 25
S. CAL. L. REV. 75, 88 (1951) (citing cases); see also Magness v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr.
3d 318, 325 (Ct. App.), petition for review granted, 260 P.3d 284 (Cal. 2011) (citing Barry, 29 P.
1026).
111. In fact, Coke treated breaking and entry together, almost as a single requirement.  COKE,
supra note 17, at 64.
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
113. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-5, -6 (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.310 (2011); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1506, -1507 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-201 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
18-4-202, -203 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-101,-102, -103 (West 2012); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 824, 825, 826 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02 (West 2012); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-7-1 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-810, -811 (West 2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/19-1 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 713.1 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5807
(West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 511.020, -.030, -.040 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 401 (2011); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 569.160, -170 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-204
(2009); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:18-2 (2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.20, -.30 (McKinney 2010);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-02 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2911.11, -.12, -.13 (West 2011)
(“No person by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass . . . .”) (Trespass is defined in part as to
“knowingly enter or remain.”  Id. § 2911.21); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.215 (West 2011); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-32-1, -3, -8 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-402 (2011); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 30.02 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
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jurisdictions require that the remaining be “surreptitious”  (language114
recommended by the Model Penal Code provision for criminal trespass ) or115
“concealed.”   The extension of burglary statutes explicitly to situations where116
the defendant “remains unlawfully” or simply “remains” seems to have begun
sometime between the 1951 studies (which reported that entry was a technical
requirement in every jurisdiction, although many courts did not require a
trespassory entry ) and the revised comments to the Model Penal Code,117
published in 1980.  The revised comments to burglary noted with regret that New
York and several other states had “recently” adopted the “enters or remains
unlawfully” language.  118
As a result, even where the initial entry was permitted and lawful, a burglary
conviction may result if the defendant remains, after permission is withdrawn,
with the intent to commit a crime.   Under this theory, a defendant may be119
convicted of burglary as well as robbery when the defendant enters an open
business and robs it.   Furthermore, where the statute includes “remaining” as120
an alternative to entry, the criminal intent may be formed at any time while the
defendant remains on the premises and need not have been formed at the time of
entry.   In these jurisdictions, a consensual visit that turns ugly might be121
prosecuted as a burglary.122
Whether the statute requires that entering or remaining be trespassory also
matters.  If there is no such requirement, then shoplifting may be burglary.  Thus,
without the requirement of breaking or even unlawful entry, the character of
burglary in many places has expanded considerably from the common law crime
13, § 1201 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.52.020, -.025, -.030 (West 2012); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-3-301 (2011).
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 401; N.J. REV. STAT. §
2C:18-2; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-02; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1201.
115. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
116. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-402; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02.
117. See A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1012; Wright, supra note 7, at
416.
118. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1, cmt. 3, at 69-71.
119. See, e.g., People v. Leonard, 921 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Morton,
768 N.E.2d 730, 737-38 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
120. See Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293, 307 (Ky. 1997), overruled on other
grounds by McQueen v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 441 (Ky. 2011) (upholding burglary
conviction where defendant entered gas station, shot two employees and fled with contents of cash
register).  But if the defendant leaves immediately after permission to remain is revoked, there is
no burglary.  See Wilburn v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Ky. 2010) (finding insufficient
evidence of burglary where defendant entered open liquor store, attempted to rob clerk, but fled
when clerk revoked permission to enter by firing a gun).
121. See State v. Garcia, 236 P.3d 853, 856 (Utah Ct. App. 2010) (upholding burglary
conviction where defendant may have formed intent to assault victim after entering but while
remaining).
122. See Leonard, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 340; Morton, 768 N.E.2d at 737-38.
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of house-breaking.123
The extreme breadth of a statute that only requires “remaining” with the
intent to commit a crime is illustrated by a series of South Dakota cases.  The
South Dakota statute enacted in 1976 defined third degree burglary as follows: 
“Any person who enters or remains in an unoccupied structure, with intent to
commit any crime therein, is guilty of third degree burglary.”   In one case, a124
defendant entered a laundromat while it was open to the public and then pried
open coin boxes with a crow bar, and stole a case of soda pop.   Another125
burglary conviction was upheld where the defendant entered a convenience store
during business hours and attempted to steal a frozen pizza.   But the court126
decided the expansion had gone too far when an eleven-year-old girl was
prosecuted for eating a chocolate Easter egg in a department store without
paying.   The court reversed the conviction and held that “remains” means127
“unlawful presence.”   The court eventually overruled this holding in a case128
where it upheld the conviction of twenty counts of burglary for a delivery driver
who, over an extended period of time, took cases of soda pop from a store during
his regular deliveries.   In these South Dakota cases, burglary functions as a129
location enhancement for what might otherwise be petty theft.   
D.  Dwelling
As noted, burglary had extended well beyond the home by the nineteenth
123. In this weakening or outright elimination of the common law elements of breaking and
entering, the history of modern burglary bears a striking resemblance to the history of another crime
with roots in the common law:  rape.  The common law definition of rape had elements that parallel
those of burglary’s breaking and entering:  force and penetration.  See LAFAVE, supra note 9, §
17.1, at 892.  As with burglary, these elements are retained in most modern statutes for the most
serious grades of the offense, but not necessarily for lesser degrees.  Moreover, the degree of force
may be minimal, and permission for entry may be revoked.  Lesser offenses have been defined for
sexual conduct that does not rise to the level of rape, just as lesser breaking or entering offenses
such as trespass have developed in most jurisdictions.  Like common law burglary, common law
rape was both a crime against property and a crime against personal security.  Unlike burglary, of
course, modern rape is clearly an offense against a person, rather than property.  It can nevertheless
be viewed, like burglary, as essentially a kind of invasion.
124. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-32-8 (1976) (amended 1989 and 2005).
125. State v. Blair, 273 N.W.2d 187, 187-88 (S.D. 1979)  The conviction was upheld under
the plain language of the statute.  Id. at 188.
126. State v. Shult, 380 N.W.2d 352, 356 (S.D. 1986).
127. In re T.J.E., 426 N.W.2d 23, 25 (S.D. 1988), superseded by statute as stated in State v.
Miranda, 776 N.W.2d 77 (S.D. 2009).
128. Id.
129. State v. Burdick, 712 N.W.2d 5, 10 (S.D. 2006).  The legislature then amended the statute
to add language based on the Model Penal Code:  “unless the premises are, at the time, open to the
public or the person is licensed or privileged to enter or remain.”  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-32-8
(2011).
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century.  The Model Penal Code accepted this enlarged scope of the crime,
referring to the entry of a “building or occupied structure, or separately secured
or occupied portion thereof,”  but it stopped short of including vehicles or130
storage containers.131
The great variety in statutory schemes makes state approaches difficult to
compare.  Some states provide a list of places that may be burglarized in a
definition section.  Others include the list in the section that defines the crime of
burglary.  Still others create separate provisions or crimes for each type of
structure, and others develop the list in caselaw.  Despite this variation, however,
the substantive law of the states is quite similar; buildings, structures, vehicles,
and containers for storing or securing goods can all be objects of burglary.
Today, many jurisdictions have lists  that usually include the buildings and132
structures already commonly mentioned in 1951, but with some very specific
additions:  outhouse,  cash register,  vending machine,  “vault, safe, cash133 134 135
register, coin vending machine, product dispenser, . . . coin telephone,”136
cemetery,  tent,  “outside showcase or other outside enclosed counter.”  137 138 139
Other jurisdictions have more general provisions that can be read broadly to
130. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
131. “Restricting the offense to buildings and other occupied structures confines it to those
intrusions that are typically the most alarming and dangerous.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt.
3(b), at 72 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
132. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-1(2) (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1501(12) (“any
vending machine or any building, object, vehicle, railroad car”), -1506(A)(1) (“a fenced commercial
or residential yard”) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-202 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West
2012); D.C. CODE § 22-801(b) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.011 (West 2012) (containing special
provisions for structures damaged during a state of emergency—presumably meant to cover
hurricane damaged property); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1401 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5807
(West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.110 (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-33
(2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.060 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1435 (2011); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.04.110(5) (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-12 (West 2012). 
Some jurisdictions define separate offenses for different categories of structures or vehicles
entered.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.113, -.114, -.115, -.356b (West 2012); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 14-51, -53, -54, -56, -56.1, -56.2, -56.3 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-2 to -6
(2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §30.02 to -.04 (West 2011).
133. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 459.
134. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-202.
135. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1501(13) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-202.
136. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-204(1) (2011) (third degree burglary).
137. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:62 (2011).
138. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5807 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.110 (West
2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1438 (2011).
139. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.114 (West 2012).
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cover a variety of structures:  “structure,”  “building,”  and “structure, vehicle,140 141
watercraft or aircraft.”   All jurisdictions also recognize burglary of a portion142
of a building, such as separate apartments in an apartment building.   A few143
jurisdictions extend burglary to either a “fenced area,”  “fenced commercial or144
residential yard,”  or even the “land or premises of another.”145 146
For the highest degree of the offense, in fourteen states the site of the
burglary must be a dwelling.   Three jurisdictions require that the highest147
degree of the offense take place in an “occupied structure.”   Tennessee and148
Texas require the highest degree of burglary to occur in a “habitation,”  while149
Vermont requires an “occupied dwelling.”   In nine states, commission of the150
offense in a dwelling is one of (or part of) two or more alternative ways of
committing the highest degree of the crime.   These numbers do not seem to151
have changed much since the 1951 research. 
E.  Of Another
This common law requirement—that the structure entered be that “of
another”—had already almost disappeared from the statutory definitions of
140. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 401 (2011); see also IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1 (2011)
(“building or structure”).
141. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-810, -811 (West 2011).
142. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511.010 (West 2011).
143. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.205(1) (West 2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3502 (West 2012) (a building “or separately secured or occupied portion thereof”); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 1201 (2011) (“any portion of a building, structure or premises which differs from one or
more other portions of such building, structure or premises with respect to license or privilege to
enter, or to being open to the public”).
144. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.04.110(5) (West 2012).
145. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1506 (2012).
146. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.13 (West 2011); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-507
(2011) (“any real estate or any improvements erected thereon”).
147. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-5 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-201 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 460 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 826 (2012); D.C. CODE § 22-801 (2012); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-202 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 14 (West 2012); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-17-23 (2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.30 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-51 (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1431 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-2 (2011); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-311 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-11 (West 2012).
148. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-204 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.11 (West
2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-32-1 (2011).
149. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-403 (2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(d) (West 2011).
150. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1201 (2011).
151. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.300 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-101 (West 2012);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-810(1)(c) (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:60 (2011); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.582 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:1 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-
02 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.225 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. § 943.10(2)(e) (2011).
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burglary by the mid-twentieth century.   Even the Model Penal Code contains152
no such language, although the drafters believed that the requirement of an
unprivileged entry would obviate the need for it.   153
In the last thirty years, however, even this implied element has been eroded
in an additional way, as courts convict defendants of burglary for entering a
home in which they have a possessory right but where there is a no-contact or
protection order preventing them from entering the home, or even where there is
no court order but the defendant has moved out.   In New Hampshire, for154
example, a defendant whose name was on the lease was convicted of burglary
when he entered the home after being asked to move out and having his
belongings removed.  In this way, courts and prosecutors are able to use155
burglary law as another weapon against domestic violence.  156
Today, ten jurisdictions have statutes that require that the structure entered
be “of another.”   Four of those jurisdictions include the phrase in only one of157
several burglary statutes, giving the impression that the language is vestigial, a
remnant from the common law.   But many jurisdictions have other words or158
phrases implying that the “entry” or “remaining” must be trespassory or
unpermitted by the one in possession.  The most common word is “unlawfully,”
as in to “enter or remain unlawfully.”   About two-thirds of the jurisdictions159
using this phrase also have a statutory definition, most commonly incorporating
152. Wright, supra note 7, at 419.
153. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. 1, at 64-65 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980). 
The comment notes disapprovingly that “[t]he language of some statutes appeared to be broad
enough to make a burglar out of one who entered his own house or office with the purpose of
committing a crime, whether it be to prepare a fraudulent income tax return or to commit an assault
upon his wife.”  Id.
154. See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006).  Suk writes of a
case where the court upheld a burglary conviction where the defendant had moved out of the marital
home, but there was no court order excluding him from the house.  Id. at 28.
155. State v. McMillan, 973 A.2d 287 (N.H. 2009).
156. See, e.g., State v. Hagedorn, 679 N.W.2d 666 (Iowa 2004).
157. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-201 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-1 (2011); IND. CODE §
35-43-2-1 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 6-202, -203 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 265, § 18C (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-23 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-53
(2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1431 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-89 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-3-11 (West 2012).
158. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 18C; MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-23; OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 1431; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-89.
159. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-5 to -7 (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.310 (2011); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-1507 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-201; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-4-202, -203
(2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-101, -102 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 826
(2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-810 (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511.020 (West 2011);
MO. REV. STAT. § 569.160 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-204 (2009); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
140.00 (McKinney 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.215 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
202 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.020 (West 2012).
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language similar to that of the Model Penal Code:  “unless the premises are at the
time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.”   An160
additional group of states incorporates similar language into the definition of the
crime itself.   Other phrases include, “without authority,”  “unauthorized,”161 162 163
“having no right, license or privilege,”  or “without consent.”   Thus,164 165
generally there is an implied element that the place of the burglary be that of
another, but it does not always apply.
F.  Intent to Commit a Felony Therein
The Model Penal Code proposed “with purpose to commit a crime therein,”
in large part to obviate proof problems for prosecutors who, under the common
law formulation, were required to show that the intended crime was not a
misdemeanor. 
Today, the largest group of states has taken the Model Penal Code’s
suggestion of “any crime,”  although about a quarter of that group uses different166
160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).  See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350(a) (2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1501(2) (2012); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-39-101 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-201 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-100
(West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 829 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-201 (2009); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 140.00(5) (McKinney 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.205 (West 2011); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-201(3) (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.010(5) (West 2012).
161. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:18-2 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-02 (2011); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-32-1 (2011); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02 (West 2012).  Florida limits
the Model Penal Code exception, however, and allows conviction even where presence is lawful
if the defendant “commit[s] or attempt[s] to commit a forcible felony.”  Id. § 810.02(1)(b)(2)(c).
162. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/19-1 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5807 (West
2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-301 (2011).
163. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:60 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-14-8 (West 2012).
164. IOWA CODE ANN. § 713.1 (West 2012).
165. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.581 (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311 (2011); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-8-2 (2011) (“without the consent of the owner or tenant”); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-14-402 (2011) (“without the effective consent of the property owner”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 30.02 (West 2011) (“without the effective consent of the owner”); WIS. STAT. § 943.10 (2011)
(“without the consent of the person in lawful possession”).
166. See ALA. CODE § 13A-7-5 (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.310 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-4-202 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-101, -102, -103 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 824, 825, 826 (2012); D.C. CODE § 22-801 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02; KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 511.020, -.030 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 401 (2011); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.582 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-23 (2011); MO. REV. STAT. §§
569.160, -170 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-204 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:1
(2012); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:18-2 (2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.20, -.30 (McKinney 2010);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-02; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1431 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
164.215 (West 2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-
311 to -313 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-32-1, -3, -8 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-11
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intended offenses for different degrees of burglary.   The next largest group167
requires that the defendant intend to commit “any theft or any felony,”168
although the precise wording of the statutes varies, and again, a number of these
states have different intended crimes for different degrees or kinds of burglary.169
A few states list particular intended crimes  or restrict the intended crimes to170
“crimes against a person or property therein.”171
G.  How Burglary Is Graded
The Model Penal Code drafters decided against including a first-degree
burglary, and instead proposed that burglary be a third-degree felony unless
“perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night,” or if the actor “inflicts or
attempts to inflict bodily injury” or “is armed with explosives or a deadly
weapon.”   Thus, the Model Code incorporated into its formulation of burglary172
some of the elements of common law burglary as aggravating facts, as well as
some of the already commonly used aggravators such as injury or weapons.  The
comments explain that the drafters believed first-degree burglary was
unnecessary because where additional serious crimes were committed, those
crimes could be separately punished.   However, the second degree offense was173
proposed, in part, out of deference to common practice, but also because “[t]he
sanctions of a second-degree felony normally could not be reached in such cases
by prosecution for any additional felonies that may have been committed . . . .”174
(West 2012).
167. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-5, -6 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-4-202, -203 (2011);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-17-23, -33 (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1431, 1435 (2011); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 61-3-11, -12 (West 2012).
168. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-6; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1507 (2012); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-39-202 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-1 (2011);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1401 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/19-1 (West 2012); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:60 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.110, -.111 (West 2012); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-507 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-3 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-53, -54,
-54.1, -56 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.12 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1435; VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-89 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-12; WIS. STAT. § 943.10; WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-3-301 (2011).
169. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-39-201, -202 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2911.11, -.12,
-.13 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-89.
170. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 6-202, -203 (West 2011) (“theft or a crime of
violence,” “theft, a crime of violence, or arson”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-3 (2011) (“murder, sexual
assault, robbery, arson or larceny”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2011) (felony, theft, an
assault on any person, lewdness, sexual battery, lewdness involving a child, voyeurism).
171. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-810 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.020
(West 2012).
172. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
173. Id. § 221.1 cmt. 4, at 78-79.
174. Id. § 221.1 cmt. 4, at 79. The drafters did not foresee the proliferation of weapon
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The Model Penal Code proposal may have influenced states more than is
generally recognized.  Today, only eight states have a separate offense of
burglary with explosives.   Although “night” is an aggravating factor in only175
seven states today,  in approximately thirty states whether the offense was176
committed in a dwelling or its equivalent is an element (or alternative element)
of the most serious type of burglary.   At least twenty-eight states have as177
elements of a more severely punished burglary offense:  (1) the fact that the
defendant was armed with a firearm, deadly weapon, or dangerous instrument;
and/or (2) that the defendant inflicted, or attempted to inflict bodily injury,
assault or battery.   States vary considerably in the wording of these178
enhancements in criminal codes.
175. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 464 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1405 (2011); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-207 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.112 (West 2012);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-37 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.075 (West 2011); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-57 (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1441 (2011).  However, explosives are mentioned in
fourteen states as a fact to elevate the crime.  See ALA. CODE § 13A-7-5 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-4-202 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-101 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 826
(2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 713.3 (West 2012); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 511.020 (West 2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 569.160 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-
204 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:1 (2012); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:18-2 (2011); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 140.25, -.30 (McKinney 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311(2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-6-203 (West 2011).
176. See supra note 101.
177. See ALA. CODE § 13A-7-5; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1508 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-39-201 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 460 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-202; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-101; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 825, 826 (2012); D.C. CODE § 22-801(a)
(2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02; HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-810 (West 2011); IND. CODE § 35-43-2-
1 (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511.030 (West 2011) (second degree); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17A, § 401 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-202 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
266, §§ 14, 15 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.110a (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.582 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-23 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:1; N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 140.20, -.30 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-22-02 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.11 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1431
(2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.225 (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1201 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.52.025 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-3-11, -12 (West 2012).
178. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-5; ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.300 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-202;
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-101; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 826; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02;
HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-810; IOWA CODE ANN. § 713.3 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
511.020; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:60 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 401 (2011);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.582; MO. REV. STAT. § 569.160; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-204; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:1; N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:18-2; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-4 (West 2012);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.25, -.30; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-02; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2911.11; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.225; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
22-32-1 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-14-402, -403 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-203;
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requirements and whether one, two, or all of these aggravating elements are
required. 
Other slightly less common reasons to increase the severity of burglary are: 
the presence in the entered structure of a person who is not a criminal
participant,  the defendant’s prior burglary convictions,  and the nature of the179 180
crime intended.   Some states increase punishment for entering certain types of181
buildings, such as religious structures or day care centers.   A few states182
increase the penalty if the victim of the crime is over sixty years of age.   Two183
states have higher penalties for burglaries of pharmacies or other places that
lawfully keep controlled substances.   Some states have separate offenses for184
entry of vehicles.185
States grade burglary offenses in a variety of ways.  Some have very
complicated schemes, with multiple offenses aimed at burglary of different
structures, with different intents or with different victims.   These are generally186
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.020 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. § 943.10 (2011).  Some include
being armed with what seems to be a firearm or weapon.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.582;
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.30.
179. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-102 (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 22-801; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 810.02(3); IOWA CODE ANN. § 713.3; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5807 (West 2011); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.110a; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.582; MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-23 (2011)
(if terrorized); MO. REV. STAT. § 569.160; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2911.11; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1431; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (West 2012); WIS. STAT.
§ 943.10.
180. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-1(b) (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 401; MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 14, 15; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.060 (West 2011) (defendant with
prior conviction may not have suspended sentence or probation); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-8-2, -2.2
(2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311.
181. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-203 (West 2011) (intent to steal firearm); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.110a (“felony, larceny or assault”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (West
2011) (“a felony other than felony theft”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-90 (2011) (“murder, rape,
robbery or arson”).
182. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/19-1 (West 2012) (school, day care, place of
worship); IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1 (structure for religious worship); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.582(2)(b) (“government building, religious establishment, historic property, or school
building”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-380 (2011) (bank).  Federal breaking and entering statutes are
similarly tailored to the entry of particular structures.  See infra Part IV.
183. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 826 (sixty-two years or older); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
351 (2011) (sixty-five years or older); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-2.3 (2011) (sixty years or older).
184. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-4-202(3), - 204(2), -303(2) (2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.582(2)-(3).
185. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.04 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-204
(West 2011).
186. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
750.110 to -.115 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-51 to -57 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-8-1
to -9 (2011).
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states that continued to add to their criminal codes in lieu of revising them.  Most
states have first degree or “aggravated” burglary, in addition to lower degrees or
lesser versions.  Only a few follow the Model Penal Code suggestion that
burglary be no more than a second degree felony.   It is difficult to compare187
schemes between states due to the varying terminology and different approaches
to ordering offenses.
Of course, any survey of the grading of burglary will only present part of the
picture due to the prevalence of determinate sentencing.  In states with
determinate sentencing schemes like the Federal Sentencing Reform Act,188
punishment will be graded by the sentencing laws in addition to the statutory
scheme.  These laws might have aggravating and mitigating circumstances based
on the amount stolen, whether the defendant was armed, the status of the victim,
the number of prior convictions, etc.   Sentencing law has the potential to usurp189
the traditional role of offense definition in grading offenses. 
H.  Conclusion
Since the publication of the Model Penal Code, the crime of burglary has
continued to streamline itself, shedding the elements of night time, breaking, and
felonious intent, while extending its reach to all kinds of locations.  Most
significantly, the element of entry has been replaced by the alternative of
“remaining.”  Although state laws vary considerably, in its most streamlined
forms, burglary now consists of being in a particular location with the intent to
commit a crime.  The most common factors that aggravate punishment include
entry of a dwelling, infliction of injury, or being armed.
IV.  FEDERAL BREAKING AND ENTERING OFFENSES
Neither of the 1951 surveys of American burglary law included federal
crimes.   There is no general federal crime of burglary.  There are, however,190
several very specific “entry” or “breaking and entry” offenses aimed at protecting
particular federal interests. The federal bank robbery statute, for example,
includes punishment for:
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any
savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as
a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to
commit in such bank, credit union or in such savings and loan
association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony affecting
187. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:18-2 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16-3, -4 (West
2012).
188. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
189. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535 (West 2012) (setting forth aggravating
circumstances for sentencing purposes).
190. See A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, supra note 7, at 1009 n.3; Wright, supra note
7, at 415 n.36.
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such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in
violation of any statute of the United States, or any larceny[.]191
This offense bears little resemblance to common law burglary or modern
state burglary statutes.  It applies to both entry and attempted entry, is restricted
to certain financial institutions, and restricts the types of intended crimes.  The
provision was added in 1937 to the bank robbery statute “to cover the situation
where a person enters a bank for the purpose of committing a crime, but is
frustrated for some reason before completing the crime.”   Like state burglary192
statutes, however, it appears to be used not only as a version of attempt, but also
to aggravate a completed crime.   “Entry” now includes using a cash machine193
or drive-up window.194
A different offense for a post office is found at 18 U.S.C. § 2115:
Whoever forcibly breaks into or attempts to break into any post office,
or any building used in whole or in part as a post office, with intent to
commit in such post office, or building or part thereof, so used, any
larceny or other depredation, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.195
Unlike § 2113, this offense requires forcible breaking.  It has been referred to as
“burglary of a United States Post Office”  as well as “post office robbery,”196 197
and appears applicable to either situation. 
Another federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2116, makes it a crime to enter “by
violence” a post-office car, steamboat or vessel assigned to the use of the mail
service.   Section 2117 makes it a crime to “break[] the seal or lock of any198
railroad car, vessel, aircraft, motortruck, wagon or other vehicle or of any
pipeline system, containing interstate or foreign shipments of freight or express
or other property, or enter[] any such vehicle or pipeline system with intent in
either case to commit larceny therein.”   The offense can be charged along with199
a completed larceny.200
Still another federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2118, defines the offenses of
“robberies and burglaries involving controlled substances.”  It punishes: 
191. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006).
192. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 406-07 (1957).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Goudy, 792 F.2d 664, 678 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding
convictions for entering a bank, larceny, conspiracy to commit larceny, and additional offenses);
United States v. Phillips, 609 F.2d 1271, 1272 (8th Cir. 1979) (convictions upheld for entering a
bank, conspiracy to take money from a bank and for taking money from a bank).
194. Goudy, 792 F.2d at 675 n.11; Phillips, 609 F.2d at 1273.
195. 18 U.S.C. § 2115 (2006).
196. United States v. York, 171 F. App’x 655, 655 (9th Cir. 2006).
197. United States v. Jackson, 347 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2003).
198. 18 U.S.C. § 2116 (2006).
199. Id. § 2117.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Kiff, 377 F. Supp. 2d 586, 590 (E.D. La. 2005).
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“Whoever, without authority, enters or attempts to enter, or remains in, the
business premises or property of a person registered with the Drug Enforcement
Administration . . . with the intent to steal any material or compound containing
any quantity of a controlled substance . . . .”201
Enacted in 1992, this offense more resembles state burglary statutes than
some of the other federal “entry” offenses in that it uses terms such as “without
authority” and “or remains.”  However, unlike most state burglary offenses, it
applies only to a narrow set of victims and intended offenses.
Two statutes come close to creating general federal burglary statutes for
specific locations.  The first, 18 U.S.C. § 2276, makes it a crime to “break[] or
enter[] any vessel with intent to commit any felony,” when the vessel is on the
water and within the jurisdiction of the United States but “out of the jurisdiction
of any particular State.”   The second, 18 U.S.C. § 1991, punishes entering a202
train with the intent to commit “any crime or offense against any person or
property thereon,” and provides a higher punishment for entry of a train with
intent to commit murder or robbery.   Although these statutes, dating from the203
first half of the twentieth century, are not used much now, they apparently can
be used to “pile on” punishment for the completed crime.  204
The Court has stated in another context that unless Congress uses common
law terms in defining a crime, mere similarity between a statutory offense and a
common law crime does not mean that common law concepts apply.   Although205
some of the federal offenses resemble burglary in that they criminalize entry with
criminal intent, they do not appear to draw on the common law and there is no
general federal burglary offense.  Like state burglary offenses, however, they can
function as “location aggravators,” adding punishment to other completed or
attempted crimes.
V.  BURGLARY AS AGGRAVATION BY LOCATION
Modern day burglary, stripped of many of the common law requirements
such as breaking or even entering, can function essentially to increase the
punishment of the intended (and most likely completed) offense based on its
location.  This additional punishment might come through anti-merger statutes,
201. 18 U.S.C. § 2118(b) (2006).
202. Id. § 2276.
203. Id. § 1991.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Castillo,127 F. App’x 385, 386 (10th Cir. 2005)
(defendant pled to “(1) conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 371
by committing a theft from an interstate shipment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 659; by entering a
train to commit a crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1991; and by breaking or entering carrier
facilities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2117; (2) trespassing upon a railroad car with intent to commit
a crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1991; (3) entering a railroad car with intent to commit a theft,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2117; and (4) assaulting a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
111(a)(1).”).
205. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 265-67 (2000) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b)).
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sentencing laws or death penalty statutes.  The concept of increasing punishment
for an offense because of where it took place is not new to criminal law.   But206
because burglary is considered, and often functions as, a distinct offense, its role
as a “location aggravator” is not fully recognized.
Burglary has taken on this role in addition to covering the traditional
“unlawful entry to commit theft” offenses.  This traditional concept of burglary
still dominates the public understanding of the term,  and burglary offenses are207
still reported as “property crimes” in compilations of crime statistics.   But the208
role of burglary as an “aggravator” of other crimes is not much discussed.
Punishing a defendant for burglary as well as the underlying offense does not
violate double jeopardy as long as there is a clear legislative intent to allow a
burglary conviction separate from a conviction for the offense that was the object
of the burglary.   The majority rule is that burglary and any underlying crimes209
206. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.435 (West 2012) (authorizing increased
penalties for drug crimes committed in a school, on a school bus, on a public transit vehicle, in a
public park, etc.).
207. Wikipedia reports, for example, “Burglary (also called breaking and entering and
sometimes housebreaking) is a crime, the essence of which is illegal entry into a building for the
purposes of committing an offense.  Usually that offense will be theft, but most jurisdictions specify
others which fall within the ambit of burglary.”  Burglary, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Burglary (last visited June 10, 2012).  An online thesaurus offers the following synonyms for
burglar:  “housebreaker, thief, robber, pilferer, filcher, cat burglar, sneak thief, picklock.”  Burglar,
FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/burglar (last visited June 10, 2012).  Many
online dictionaries also include the old common law definition of the crime.  See, e.g., Burglary,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/burglary (last visited June 10,
2012).
208. The Bureau of Justice Statistics uses a restricted definition of burglary for purposes of
reporting burglary crimes:
Burglary is defined as unlawful or forcible entry or attempted entry of a residence.  This
crime usually, but not always, involves theft.  The illegal entry may be by force, such
as breaking a window or slashing a screen, or may be without force by entering through
an unlocked door or an open window.  As long as the person entering has no legal right
to be present in the structure a burglary has occurred.  Furthermore, the structure need
not be the house itself for a burglary to take place; illegal entry of a garage, shed, or any
other structure on the premises also constitutes household burglary.  If breaking and
entering occurs in a hotel or vacation residence, it is still classified as a burglary for the
household whose member or members were staying there at the time the entry occurred.
Burglary, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=931 (last visited
June 10, 2012).  But see Commonwealth v. Pruitt, 951 A.2d 307, 315 (Pa. 2008) (holding burglary
properly considered a crime of violence and therefore prior burglary convictions could be
aggravating factors in penalty phase of capital trial).
209. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (holding punishment for multiple
crimes in same proceeding does not violate double jeopardy where each crime requires proof of an
element not required for conviction of the remaining crimes).  “The applicable rule is that, where
the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
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do not merge.   Thus, in the majority of states that allow multiple punishments,210
burglary can provide a significant additional penalty.
A few cases, drawn from appeals involving burglary in 2010, are illustrative. 
In Commonwealth v. Benson,  the defendant was convicted of burglary,211
robbery, simple assault, reckless endangerment, unlawful restraint, theft and
receipt of stolen property.   He received consecutive sentences on the burglary,212
robbery and theft offenses.   Testimony showed that he had entered behind an213
elderly woman as she returned home, then assaulted her and took her property.  214
In Cooper v. State,  the defendant was convicted of murder, burglary, armed215
robbery, and other offenses when he and his accomplices entered (most likely
through an open door) the home of some persons they had been riding with, then
assaulted the occupants with a gun and a bottle, ultimately taking property and
strangling one person.   In State v. Jacobs,  the defendant was convicted of216 217
robbery, impersonating a law enforcement officer, first degree burglary and
second-degree kidnapping.   The evidence showed that defendant and his218
accomplices pretended to be DEA agents conducting a raid, knocked on the
victims’ door, entered with guns drawn, bound the victims, and took their
property.   In Walker v. State,  the defendant was convicted of burglary,219 220
robbery and criminal confinement when he kicked in the door of a home, entered
with a drawn gun, bound the victims, and then took property.   In People v.221
Leonard,  the defendant was convicted of second degree kidnapping, third222
degree possession of a weapon, endangering the welfare of a child, and second
degree burglary when he was allowed into his child’s mother’s home for a visit,
but then used violence to hold the child and attempt to take her.223
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact which the other does not.”  Id. at 304.  Burglary will usually require either an entry
or remaining, elements most likely not included in the target offense.
210. See State v. Pancake, 296 S.E.2d 37, 41-42 (W. Va. 1982) (collecting cases); see also OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.067 (West 2011) (providing that burglary and the underlying offense do
not merge); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.50 (West 2012).
211. 10 A.3d 1268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).
212. Id. at 1270.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1269.
215. 700 S.E.2d 593 (Ga. 2010), disapproved on other grounds by Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 768
(2012).
216. Id. at 594.
217. 688 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
218. Id. at 729.
219. Id.
220. 932 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
221. Id. at 734-35.
222. 921 N.Y.S.2d 337 (App. Div. 2011).
223. Id. at 339-40.
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In these cases, rather than functioning as a “generalized law of attempts,”224
the burglary charges add a significant penalty to what are already very serious
crimes.  In effect, burglary operates as a location aggravator—increasing the
penalty for offenses based on where they are committed.  In the above instances,
the offenses all took place in the victims’ homes.  But the expansion of burglary
law would allow for an aggravating effect for offenses committed in any building
or other structure specified by the statute of the particular jurisdiction.  For
example, in Graham v. Florida,  best known for its holding that a sentence of225
life without parole is unconstitutional when imposed on juvenile offenders for
non-capital offenses, the defendant pleaded to armed burglary and attempted
armed robbery.   The defendant’s accomplice had let the defendant and another226
person into the restaurant where he worked shortly after closing.   One of the227
accomplices struck the manager on the head with a metal bar, and the offenders
left without taking any money.   In a Kentucky case, the defendant was charged228
with murder, first degree robbery and first degree burglary when he entered a gas
station, shot two employees and fled with money from the cash register.   In229
both cases, the burglary charge was possible simply because the robbery (like
many robberies) occurred in a building.
Burglary plays a significant aggravation role in death penalty schemes. 
Furman v. Georgia,  the 1972 case in which the Supreme Court invalidated230
Georgia’s death penalty, involved a felony murder where burglary was the
underlying felony.   Surprised during the burglary of a home, Furman had231
tripped and not meant to shoot the victim.  Although Furman’s sentence was
reversed,  and subsequent law would restrict capital punishment in felony-232
murder cases to those where the defendant was a major participant in the crime
and acted with at least reckless indifference to human life,  burglary continues233
to be important in death penalty law because it is included in most death penalty
schemes as an “aggravating” circumstance or “special circumstance” that will
make the defendant eligible for the death penalty.
Modern capital sentencing statutes build upon the structure of the revised
Georgia law upheld in Gregg v. Georgia.   These statutes typically narrow the234
class of murders eligible for the death penalty by requiring the jury to find
224. Cocke, supra note 86, at 213.
225. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
226. Id. at 2018, 2034.
227. Id. at 2018.
228. Id.
229. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 2011).
230. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
231. Id. at 252 (Douglas, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 239-40.
233. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 168 (1987).
234. 428 U.S.153, 207 (1976); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.1(b),
at 1237 (5th ed. 2009).
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beyond a reasonable doubt not only the elements of first-degree murder, but also
the presence of an aggravating or special circumstance.   Only if the jury has235
found the defendant guilty of the crime and the aggravating circumstance  does236
the jury consider aggravating and mitigating factors for and against the death
penalty.  The aggravating circumstances, although intended to narrow the class
of murders subject to consideration for capital punishment, have tended to
proliferate under legislatures wishing to show they are tough on crime.   But237
from the beginning, most jurisdictions have included the contemporaneous
commission of five felonies—arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape, or robbery—as
aggravating circumstances.   This “contemporaneous felony” aggravating238
circumstance was suggested by the Model Penal Code.   Twenty-seven out of239
thirty-nine death penalty jurisdictions include contemporaneous burglary as an
aggravating circumstance.  240
Generally, the aggravating circumstance is worded along the lines of the
Model Penal Code recommendation for the death penalty:  “The murder was
committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or an attempt
to commit . . . burglary . . . .”   In addition, some jurisdictions, such as241
California, allow the death penalty for felony-murder  where the underlying242
felony is a burglary, and then “double-count” the burglary by allowing the
burglary to constitute the aggravating circumstance.  243
An example of burglary as a death penalty aggravating circumstance is
235. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2012) (§ 190.2(4) held unconstitutional by
People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561 (Ca. 1990)); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 2011).
236. “Aggravating factors may also be referred to as aggravating circumstances or eligibility
factors.  In California, the term ‘special circumstance’ is used to express this concept.”  Chelsea
Creo Sharon, Note, The “Most Deserving” of Death:  The Narrowing Requirement and the
Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
223, 223 n.3 (2011).
237. See id. at 232-35 (explaining how expansion of aggravating factors has undermined the
Supreme Court’s “narrowing requirement”).
238. See generally David McCord, Should Commission of a Contemporaneous Arson,
Burglary, Kidnapping, Rape, or Robbery be Sufficient to Make a Murderer Eligible for a Death
Sentence?—An Empirical and Normative Analysis, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2009).
239. Id. at 22 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(e) (Official Draft & Revised
Comments 1980)).
240. Id. at 24.
241. Id. at 22 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(e)).
242. Indeed, the use of burglary to support felony-murder is an interesting topic in itself.  See,
e.g., People v. Fuller, 150 Cal. Rptr. 515 (Ct. App. 1978) (upholding charge of felony-murder
where defendant caused death during high-speed chase following burglary of a parked car).
243. See Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty, and Ordinary Robbery-
Burglary Murderers:  A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. REV. 719, 730 (2007); see also McCord,
supra note 238, at 23 n.100 (explaining four common statutory patterns for incorporating
felonies—including burglary—as an aggravating circumstance in death penalty prosecutions).
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provided in  McCray v. State.   The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals upheld244
a death penalty conviction where the murder was made death eligible by the
contemporaneous commission of burglary.   The defendant argued that since he245
had entered the victim’s home with permission, he could not be said to have
entered or remained unlawfully.   But the court disagreed, reasoning that246
evidence of a struggle—shown by the profusion of blood loss and
injuries—could support a finding that permission to enter had been revoked, thus
supporting a finding of burglary.   Another example is the Kentucky gas station247
robbery and murder case discussed above,  where the burglary and robbery248
charges were used to qualify the defendant for the death penalty.
The use of burglary and other felonies to impose the death penalty has been
justly criticized; one argument is that these aggravators apply in the majority of
murders, and that they do not represent the “worst of the worst.”   One author249
concludes that “ordinary” robbery-burglary murderers are “in every respect, the
‘average’ murderers.”   The fact that burglary can be charged will usually mean250
only that the murder occurred in a building, perhaps a dwelling if the death
penalty statute requires first-degree burglary and if that jurisdiction’s first degree
burglary requires entry of a dwelling.  In most jurisdictions, the other elements
of burglary (criminal intent, entering or remaining, or—for first degree
burglary—armed with a deadly weapon or causing injury) will overlap in
substance, if not in form, with the elements of murder.  Thus, burglary functions
as a location aggravator in the death penalty context, just as it can with non-
capital crimes. 
Of course, these reported opinions showing burglary’s function as a location
aggravator in capital and non-capital cases are just the tip of the iceberg, the
visible examples.  Beneath the water is the rest of the ice, composed mostly of
the ninety percent to ninety-five percent of cases that are resolved through a
guilty plea.   The real significance of burglary’s additional role is that it251
provides prosecutors with yet another tool to induce these pleas.  
244. No. CR-06-0360, 2010 WL 5130747 (Ala. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2010).
245. Id. at *1.
246. Id. at *21.
247. Id.
248. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 441 (Ky. 2011).
249. Shatz, supra note 243, at 745; see also McCord, supra note 238, at 28 (discussing Illinois
and Massachusetts state blue ribbon panels that recommended eliminating contemporaneous
felonies as bases for death eligibility).
250. Shatz, supra note 243, at 770.
251. Simmons v. Kapture, 516 F.3d 450, 457 (6th Cir. 2008); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at tbl.11 (2009), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2009/Table11.pdf.
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VI.  THE CONTINUING INFLUENCE OF COMMON LAW BURGLARY
Despite the significant evolution of burglary from Lord Coke’s common law
definition—the withering away of several common law elements, and burglary’s
increased role as a location aggravator of other serious crimes—the common law
notion of burglary still exerts a powerful influence on the legal imagination.  A
search of state law cases for references to Lord Coke’s definition of burglary
turned up seven references from after the time of the Model Penal Code.  252
References to common law burglary in general are quite common, fifteen in 2010
alone.   The common law version of burglary is invoked occasionally as an253
analogy to support grading or creating other kinds of offenses.  For example,
securities fraud that decimated retirement accounts has been likened to home
invasion,  and some have argued for a more serious type of identity theft to be254
called “identity burglary.”   And, although courts recognize that modern255
statutory burglary is quite different from the common law crime, they
nevertheless resort not infrequently to the common law to resolve disputes about
the modern crime.   256
For example, in Washington, the statutory definition of “building” for
purposes of the burglary includes any “fenced area.”   The Washington court257
referred to the common law notion of buildings within the home’s “curtilage”
being protected by burglary laws, and used this concept to limit the meaning of
the term “fenced area” to the fenced curtilage.   The court did so despite the258
absence of any reference to the curtilage in the statute, asserting that such an
interpretation was necessary to avoid “absurd results.”   Similarly, an Arizona259
Court of Appeals case referred to the “historical purpose of sanctioning burglary
at common law,” “to punish the forcible invasion of a habitation and violation of
252. The most recent was State v. Goldsmith, 652 S.E.2d 336, 339 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
253. Search on Westlaw, 6/30/2011 using “allstates” database and query:  “common law”
“common-law” /5 (burglary burglar).
254. See Christine Hurt, Of Breaches of the Peace, Home Invasions and Securities Fraud, 44
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1365, 1365-68 (2007).  The author posited that personal financial ruin was a
greater fear for many Americans than personal violence; that while in earlier times the home may
have sheltered a person’s most precious possessions, now the retirement account may be a person’s
“castle.”  Id.
255. Shane Pennington et al., A Precise Model for Identity Theft Statutes, 46 CRIM. LAW BULL.
137, 144-45 (2010) (arguing for gradations of identity theft, with the most serious version to be
“identity burglary,” accomplished either by invading a private space or a private computer).
Another author urges us to prepare for “nanotechnology crime,” and consider how some such
offenses might be prosecuted as burglary.  Susan W. Brenner, Nanocrime?, 2011 U. ILL. J.L., TECH.
& POL’Y 39, 71-72 & nn.205-10.
256. The following examples are just a sampling of many case references to the common law
of burglary.  These examples were chosen in part for their recency.
257. State v. Engel, 210 P.3d 1007, 1009 (Wash. 2009).
258. Id. at 1011.
259. Id. 
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the heightened expectation of privacy and possessory rights of individuals in
structures and conveyances,” when it found that the yard the defendant entered
did not meet the definition of a commercial yard under that state’s statute.  260
Both courts referred to common law doctrine to answer a question about statutes
that little resembled the common law crime.
Virginia courts referred to the common law concept of burglary as “primarily
an offense against the security of the habitation,” in determining that a vacation
home is a “dwelling”  and in determining that entering a utility room from261
inside the garage is not breaking and entering a dwelling.   A California262
appellate court also referred to the common law crime in holding that an
unenclosed balcony was not part of the “building” under the burglary statute.  263
That court noted, “The predominant factor underlying common law burglary was
the desire to protect the security of the home, and the person within his home. 
Burglary was not an offense against property, real or personal, but an offense
against the habitation . . . .”   The same court also extensively discussed a264
common law doctrine—burglary-by-instrument—in determining that inserting
a burning pole into the victim’s crawl space to start a fire was burglary.   A265
Mississippi court recently relied on the historical purpose of the common law
offense to hold that first degree statutory burglary is a crime of violence.   A266
Nebraska court relied on common law principles to hold that the state must allege
the crime intended by a burglary defendant.267
The common law crime is sometimes invoked as a reason to check the
unlimited expansion of statutory burglary, as it was in the Washington and
Arizona cases above.  This notion of the common law offense as a limiting
influence was also apparent in the recent back and forth between the courts and
the legislatures of Florida and South Dakota.  In Florida, the court in 2000
reversed a felony murder conviction where the underlying felony was burglary,
although the state conceded that entry was consensual.   The state argued that,268
at some point, consent was withdrawn and the defendant remained on the
premises with intent to commit murder.   In reversing, the court referred to the269
common law crime and the Model Penal Code, and held that “remaining” with
260. State v. Hinden, 233 P.3d 621, 624 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted).
261. Giles v. Commonwealth, 672 S.E.2d 879, 882 (Va. 2009) (citations omitted).
262. Lacey v. Commonwealth, 675 S.E.2d 846, 850-51 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
263. People v. Yarbrough, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 379 (Ct. App.), review granted, 253 P.3d
1152 (Cal. 2011).  The court stated that entry onto the balcony could be charged as attempted
burglary.  Id.
264. Id. (quoting People v. Valencia, 46 P.3d 920 (Cal. 2002)).
265. People v. Glazier, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 108, 110-11, 114-15 (Ct. App. 2010).
266. Brown v. State, No. 2010-KA-00352-COA, 2011 WL 2449291, at *3, *6 (Miss Ct. App.
June 21, 2011).
267. State v. Nero, 798 N.W.2d 597, 605 (Neb. 2011).
268. Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233, 236 (Fla. 2000), superseded by statute as stated in
Bradley v. State, 33 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2010).
269. Id.
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the intent to commit a crime could only be burglary if that remaining were
surreptitious.   The legislature responded by amending the statute to clearly270
abrogate that decision.   Addressing a similar issue in State v. Burdick,  the271 272
South Dakota court reversed a line of cases which had held that “enters or
remains in an unoccupied structure, with intent to commit any crime therein”273
required that the entering or remaining be unauthorized.   The dissent noted that274
without such a requirement, the burglary statute “ensnares any offense committed
indoors, no matter how petty,” and referred to the common law offense and its
traditional purpose as support.   In a mirror image of the Florida debate, the275
legislature amended the statute in accord with the dissent’s interpretation.  276
As the Florida and South Dakota examples illustrate, appeals to the common
law offense as a kind of limiting principle are countered regularly by the
recognition that modern statutes have little in common with the common law
offense, and that it is the province of the legislature to define crimes, regardless
of how they might deviate from common law.   Indeed, given how different277
most statutes are from the common law formulation, it is surprising that the
common law offense is referenced at all in the caselaw.278
What this harkening back seems to show is the surprising influence of the
common law over discussions of the statutory crime.  Modern statutory burglary
still operates in the shadow of Coke’s definition, and ironically, it may be this
shadow that obscures the radical changes that have occurred to the offense.  The
very name of the offense suggests something time-honored and traditional—a
solid crime.  To attempt yet another metaphor:  The name cloaks the modern
statutes in respectability—and prevents lawmakers and judges from seeing just
how little lies beneath that cloak.
270. Id. at 240.
271. 2001-58 FLA. LAWS 1-2 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 810.015, -.02 (West 2002)).
272. 712 N.W.2d 5 (S.D. 2006).
273. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-32-8 (1976) (amended 1989 and 2005).
274. Burdick, 712 N.W.2d at 10.
275. Id. at 10-11 (Meierhenry, J., dissenting).
276. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-32-8 (2011).
277. See, e.g., Burdick, 712 N.W.2d at 9-10.
278. The references to the common law as a limiting force may also reflect a more general
discomfort some judges feel with the expansion of criminal law.  Scholars have commented on
“overcriminalization”—the proliferation of offenses, see Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of
Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157 (1967); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001), and the increasing number
of charges that can be attached to a single incident.  Stuntz, supra, at 507 (“[F]ederal and state
codes alike are filled with overlapping crimes, such that a single criminal incident typically violates
a half dozen or more prohibitions.  Lax double jeopardy doctrine generally permits the government
to charge all these violations rather than selecting among them.”).  The ballooning of burglary is
but another symptom of this general inflation.  Appeals to common law rationalizations may in
some sense reflect a wish to go back to a time when the possible charges were fewer and more
tailored.
666 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:629
CONCLUSION
Modern burglary little resembles its common law ancestor, the offense of
breaking and entering the dwelling of another at night with the intent to commit
a felony therein.  Changes that began early in our nation’s history accelerated
during the past fifty years as burglary in many jurisdictions shed common law
elements such as breaking, entering, night time, and dwelling.  In its broadest
forms, burglary became the offense of being in the wrong place with the wrong
intent.  Its reach has extended far beyond the home.  Burglary also took on a
prominent role as a “location aggravator,” a charge that could be added to the
completed or attempted target offense and providing a significant additional
penalty to crimes such as robbery, theft, or kidnapping, if they were committed
in a place protected by the burglary statute.  In many states, a murder committed
in such a place may qualify for the death penalty on the basis of burglary.  
This survey of burglary law in the United States is the first comprehensive
look at burglary since the mid-twentieth century.  It shows the enormous
variation in state schemes, but it also shows some trends.  In spite of strong
critiques that burglary law was unfair, unnecessary and illogical, the crime of
burglary has survived and evolved.  Critics argued that burglary developed to
make up for the difficulty in proving attempts at common law.  Burglary can also
be seen as an unnecessary combination crime; a combination of an attempted or
completed crime and a criminal trespass.  But legislatures for the most part
resisted calls for reform, rejecting important aspects of the Model Penal Code
burglary provision, and continuing to broaden the reach of the burglary statutes.
This history of burglary shows the path of evolution in criminal law; how
calls for rational reform interact with pressure on judges to affirm convictions
and pressure on legislatures to protect against more wrongdoing.  It also shows
the sometimes unexpected connections between elements of an offense:  how
night time became less important as burglary moved beyond dwellings, how
eliminating the “breaking” requirement eroded the “entry” requirement, and how
substituting “remaining” for “entry” then affected the timing of the wrongful
intent.  Just as pulling on a piece of yarn may start the unraveling of a sweater,
it seems that removing one element of the offense leads to the weakening or
elimination of others.
Burglary is still a somewhat illogical crime.  When applied to housebreaking
or surreptitious entry of premises to commit theft, it seems reasonable and
supported by tradition.  But when extended to cover what would otherwise be
considered shoplifting or robbery, especially when entry was initially permitted,
burglary appears less like an actual crime addressing a separate problem than a
weapon for prosecutors to increase penalties, or extract pleas, based on where the
crime occurred.  This is especially true in the many states where burglary has lost
its actus reus, “entering,” and requires only remaining with criminal intent. 
Burglary has traveled far from its origins.  Yet the common law offense
looms large even today in discussions of the statutory crime.  Courts refer to the
common law definition and rationales regularly when addressing questions about
the modern statutes.  It is very likely the influence of the common law crime in
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the legal imagination that has allowed burglary to survive as “burglary,” even
when it no longer necessarily describes a separate offense.  Firmly lodged in our
criminal codes, the current offense evolved far from its original form, but in the
shadow of the common law.
